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CHEAP SENTIMENT
CLAIRE A. HILL∗
INTRODUCTION
Consider a person who bemoans the lack of organs available for
transplantation but strongly disapproves of any sort of compensation or other
financial inducement being paid for organs.1 Consider also a person who strongly
disapproves of the use of “cheap” labor but who buys products made using it.2
Finally, consider a person who objects to surge pricing by alternative
transportation services such as Uber, including in non-emergency situations, and
then bemoans the difficulty of getting places in bad weather or during peak
weekend or holiday times.3 These are all examples of what I call “cheap
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1. The survey evidence on people’s views about organ donation and sale and blood donation and
sale is voluminous. Among the topics studied are attitudes towards payment for organs and blood,
differences based on people’s age, race, or experiences with those giving or receiving organs or blood,
whether people would donate (sell?) more if they had financial incentives, whether payment leads to
lower-quality organs and blood being obtained (as per a debate begun in seminal work by Richard
Titmuss, see RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997)),
and whether valuable incentives other than cash payments might be effective. Regarding public attitudes
concerning organ donation and transplantation and related financial incentives, see, e.g., Klaus Hoeyer
et al., Public Attitudes to Financial Incentive Models for Organs: A Literature Review Suggests that it is
Time to Shift the Focus from “Financial Incentives” to “Reciprocity,” 26 TRANSPLANT INT’L 350 (2013);
TNS
OPINION
&
SOCIAL,
EUROBAROMETER
72.3:
ORGAN
DONATION
AND
TRANSPLANTATION (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_333a
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY97-QZ7B]; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
TRANSPLANTATION, 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN DONATION ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS (2013), https://www.organdonor.gov/dtcp/nationalsurveyorgandonation.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E5WA-UTNV]. Regarding blood donation, see, e.g., Joan Costa-Font et al., Not all Incentives Wash
out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion
Paper No. 1157, 2012), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1157.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 89VT-B7W4];
TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, EUROBAROMETER 72.3: BLOOD DONATION AND BLOOD
TRANSFUSIONS (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_333b_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/GW7L-UXEB].
2. See, e.g., Gethin Chamberlain, Admit It. You Love Cheap Clothes. And You Don’t Care About
Child Slave Labour, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/28/
india-sweated-labour [https://perma.cc/5LWN-8LL3].
3. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Why Surge Prices Make Us So Mad: What Springsteen, Home Depot, and a
Nobel Winner Know, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/upshot/whysurge-prices-make-us-so-mad-what-springsteen-home-depot-and-a-nobel-winner-know.html?_r=0
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sentiment”—having a belief that is in some sense self-serving, perhaps even
priding oneself on that belief, but not acknowledging or accepting the
consequences of policy based on the belief.4
What individuals believe and do is beyond the scope of this paper, but one
result of individual belief and action—that it can strongly affect policy—is not.
Cheap sentiment is importantly a social pathology: people look to their
communities to validate their beliefs of what is moral and what they are entitled
to. Policymakers may themselves have cheap sentiment, or they may just
formulate their policies in response to constituents and members of the society
who do.
This article argues that cheap sentiment can be an impediment to sound
policymaking in many different spheres. Cheap sentiment can lead market
approaches and solutions to be dismissed notwithstanding significant costs of
doing so. This is not to say that market approaches and solutions should always
be chosen. For instance, policymakers would presumably appropriately reject a
plan to pay a country whose citizens have bad health, short lives, and very little
money a great deal of money to accept a pollutant-emitting factory.5 But market
approaches and solutions should not be rejected for reasons that do not
acknowledge or properly take into account the costs of doing so.6
[https://perma.cc/GU5Q-PUTE]; Tim Sullivan, What Economists Don’t Get about Uber’s Surge Pricing,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 17, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/what-economists-dont-get-about-ubers-surgepricing [https://perma.cc/2A3U-WP9U].
4. The intuition at its extreme is well-captured in the lyrics from the Tom Lehrer song, “Wernher
von Braun”: “‘Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? That’s not my department!’
Says Wernher von Braun.” TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS
(Reprise/Warner Bros. Records 1965). The song is based on the life of Wernher von Braun, a German
scientist who developed rockets for the Germans in the Second World War, came to the U.S. after World
War II, and eventually began building missiles for the U.S. Army. Biography of Wernher von Braun,
HISTORY,
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/history/vonbraun/bio.html
MARSHALL
[https://perma.cc/ZH68-Z3ME] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
5. Consider, in this regard, the furor over Lawrence Summer’s letter, which he described as satire,
arguing that pollution-spewing factories should be located in low-income countries. Furor on Memo at
World Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/07/business/furor-on-memo-atworld-bank.html [https://perma.cc/LW9X-GED7] (“‘A given amount of health-impairing pollution
should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages,’ said
the memo, which was obtained from a critic of the World Bank’s environmental record. ‘I think the
economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we
should face up to that.’”). See also Toxic Memo, HARV. MAG. (May 1, 2001),
https://harvardmagazine.com/2001/05/toxic-memo.html [https://perma.cc/QFF3-WB7Q]. The furor over
the memo is considered to have adversely affected Summers’ ability to get a top job in government. A.
Siegel, Larry Summers to Bring a Foul Smell to World Bank?, DAILY KOS (Jan. 20, 2012),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/1/20/1056789/- [https://perma.cc/ZH9U-W3MT].
6. Cheap sentiment also can lead to undue faith in market approaches and solutions, an intuition
aptly captured by the famous economists’ joke in which a senior economist and a junior economist are
walking down the street, the junior economist alerts the senior economist to a $20 bill on the floor, and
the senior economist refuses to stoop down, on grounds that if the bill had been on the floor, someone
else would have picked it up. Such a view might be used to justify not outlawing racial discrimination in
employment on grounds that employers would surely hire the most productive workers, especially if they
could get some of them more cheaply, and that this effect would soon eliminate discrimination, since the
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There is of course an enormous amount of scholarship on what people
believe, why they believe it, and how to change people’s beliefs.7 The focus of this
article is most similar to that of the literature addressing inconsistencies between
a person’s beliefs or between a person’s beliefs and their actions.8 As discussed
in Part I, the labels used to describe these inconsistencies are hypocrisy and
cognitive dissonance. But this article also coins a new term, cheap sentiment.
Cheap sentiment involves a particular inconsistency, one which is societal rather
than personal: having a belief while being unwilling to acknowledge or bear
(one’s share of) the belief’s broader societal consequences. The literature
mentioned above focuses on what could be called traditional morality,
paradigmatically hypocrisy. By contrast, cheap sentiment includes people’s
senses of entitlement to a particular status quo, something that does not implicate
traditional morality.
This article frames the phenomenon of cheap sentiment in terms that should
resonate in psychology, as a pathology applicable not just in contexts traditionally
thought to be charged, and in economics, as a cost that should be taken into
account, and that could potentially be reduced by due consideration of the
consequences of the policies that instantiate it. This framing is intended to cast
light on the costs cheap sentiment imposes, and serve as a needed counterweight
to its undue force.
I
WHAT IS CHEAP SENTIMENT?
A. Cheap Sentiment Compared With Cognitive Dissonance and Hypocrisy
Cheap sentiment is related to cognitive dissonance, a concept originally from
psychology, but used in other disciplines as well, including, notably for purposes

‘$20 wouldn’t stay on the floor’ for long. See generally Kevin M. Murphy, How Gary Becker Saw the
Scourge
of
Discrimination,
CHI.
BOOTH
REV.
(June
15,
2015),
http://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/winter-2014/how-gary-becker-saw-the-scourge-ofdiscrimination [https://perma.cc/79WK-FHYC] (discussing Becker’s view that market forces would not
eliminate discrimination).
7. For works that discuss trying to change people’s behavior, see, e.g., FINDING SOLUTIONS TO
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (Mark A. Mattaini & Bruce A. Thyer
eds., 1996); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009); Nicola J. Roberts et al., Behavioral Interventions Associated
with Smoking Cessation in the Treatment of Tobacco Use, 6 HEALTH SERV. INSIGHTS 79 (2013); Robert
A. C. Ruiter et al., Applying Social Psychology to Understanding Social Problems, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: THE INTERGROUP CONTEXT (Agnieszka Golec de Zavala
& Aleksandra Cichocka eds., 2012).
8. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
177 (1994). See also Mitesh Kataria & Tobias Regner, Honestly, Why Are You Donating Money to
Charity? An Experimental Study about Self-Awareness in Status-Seeking Behavior, 79 THEORY &
DECISION 493 (2015) (presenting results of an experiment in which people demonstrated their lack of
self-awareness of their status-seeking behavior).
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of this essay, economics.9 The concept was introduced by Leon Festinger in 1957;
its seminal exposition is in a book called When Prophecy Fails: Fails: A Social and
Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the
World.10 The book explores how members of a group adjusted when the world
did not end the day their group had predicted it would: rather than concluding
that they had been mistaken, they doubled down on the belief, making further
predictions for the date of the end of the world and increasing their
proselytizing.11
A recent paper defines cognitive dissonance as “the idea that people find
having inconsistent beliefs or making inconsistent choices to be uncomfortable,
and take action to avoid this inconsistency or ‘dissonance.’”12 Another paper
defines cognitive dissonance as “the desire of an individual to perceive himself or
herself as a moral person,” such that the “individual is motivated to reduce
dissonance to alleviate this threat to self-concept and self-integrity.”13
The resolutions people use to resolve discomfort can involve changing actions
or beliefs, or rationalization, trying to account for the inconsistency; alternatively,
people may be able to ignore the dissonance.14
Cheap sentiment also involves inconsistent beliefs or actions, but the beliefs
or actions may or may not cause psychological discomfort. If they do not, there
is no reason to suppose that they would cause changes to actions or beliefs.
People may ignore the inconsistency, continuing to hold the inconsistent beliefs
or acting contrary to their beliefs. Alternatively, especially if called to explain or
9. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 8.
10. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–4 (1957); LEON FESTINGER ET
AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF A MODERN GROUP THAT
PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD (1957) [hereinafter PROPHECY]. See also Leon
Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959); Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207 SCI. AM. 93 (1962) [hereinafter
Cognitive Dissonance] for further discussions of cognitive dissonance. More recent work includes Frenk
van Harreveld et al., The ABC of Ambivalence: Affective, Behavioral and Cognitive Consequences of
Attitudinal Conflict, 52 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 285 (2015) (discussing the concept
of ambivalence as distinct from cognitive dissonance: “an important difference between [ambivalence
and dissonance] lies in the fact that dissonance is usually the result of a behavioral commitment that is in
conflict with a preexisting attitude. Ambivalence is also defined by conflict, but within one’s attitude and
often not related to any behavioral commitment.”).
11. PROPHECY, supra note 10, at 213–15.
12. Daniel F. Stone & Daniel H. Wood, Cognitive Dissonance, Motivated Reasoning, and
Confirmation Bias: Applications in Industrial Organization, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Carol Tremblay et al. eds., forthcoming May 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834072 [https://perma.cc/Y2HJ-GAJB]. The term
is sufficiently a part of everyday language that it appears in the Merriam Webster dictionary, which
defines cognitive dissonance as “psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and attitudes
held simultaneously.” Cognitive Dissonance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cognitive%20dissonance [https://perma.cc/3PTA-K2SX] (last visited Dec. 18,
2017).
13. Valerie Fointiat, “I Know What I Have to Do, But . . .”: When Hypocrisy Leads to Behavioral
Change, 32 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 741, 742 (2004).
14. See Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 10, at 93.
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justify her view, a person might use rationalization.15 A person’s recourse to
rationalization may or may not indicate that she experiences discomfort from the
inconsistency.
It may not be easy to determine whether an explanation is indeed a
rationalization. For instance, a person who does not pay her taxes might state
that she does not approve of what the government spends tax money on. This
might, or might not, be a rationalization. Is the person who bemoans the lack of
organs available for transplantation, but rejects changing rules against
compensation for organs because people should be willing to donate organs,
rationalizing? Maybe, but maybe not. There are many possible “expensive”
rationales for such a belief. A person might believe that the consequences of the
organ shortage are less problematic than the results of paying in some manner
for organs—such as encouraging unscrupulous doctors, coercing poor people for
whom the compensation will be too tempting, and other problems associated with
commodification and monetizing body parts16—and be willing, for herself and
others, to accept the consequences. We cannot know whether the person would
continue holding the belief if she or a loved one needed an organ and none were
available except via some sort of financial inducement.
A presumably less controversial case of rationalization is when a person is
rejected from a well-paying interesting job to which he applied or a prestigious
university to which he sought admission and claims that “he didn’t want to
work/go there anyway.”17 Even absent agreement that particular explanations are
rationalizations, it seems uncontroversial to assert that people do sometimes
rationalize, whether to themselves or others, to resolve inconsistencies in their
beliefs or their beliefs and their actions.

15. Neel Burton, Self-Deception I: Rationalization-Human Beings Are Not Rational, but
Rationalizing Animals, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hideand-seek/201203/self-deception-i-rationalization
[https://perma.cc/HW39-V7KS];
Rationalization,
MINDS,
http://changingminds.org/explanations/behaviors/coping/rationalization.html
CHANGING
[https://perma.cc/YAQ8-7SMG] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
16. See generally RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM
(2011) (discussing “what exactly happens when people are paid for parts of their bodies”); MICHELE
GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS (2006) (critiquing present
systems of organ procurement and allocation); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Lessons from Law About
Incomplete Commodification in the Egg Market, 33 J. APPLIED PHIL. 160 (2016) (discussing difficulty of
reconciling market realities with nonmarket ideals in the context of egg donation). In this regard, consider
Titmuss’s argument that paying for blood might lead the blood supply to be of lower-quality; those
motivated purely by the prospect of helping others might have higher quality blood than people
motivated by the cash payout, such that the former would be discouraged, but the latter would be
encouraged, to donate (sell) blood for money. See TITMUSS, supra note 1. However, empirical evidence
on the point is mixed. See, e.g., Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Moral Nimby-ism? Understanding
Societal Support for Monetary Compensation to Plasma Donors in Canada, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 3, 2018, at 83; Claudia Niza et al., Incentivizing Blood Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis
to Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 941 (2013).
17. Burton, supra note 15; Rationalization, supra note 15.
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Another related concept is hypocrisy,18 which has been described as a special
case of cognitive dissonance.19 But hypocrisy, like cheap sentiment, does not
necessarily cause psychological discomfort. A person might, for instance, be able
to ignore the extent to which they are saying one thing and doing another. Indeed,
the canonical examples of hypocrisy do not cause discomfort precisely for this
reason; scholarship often focuses on how to get people to acknowledge their
hypocrisy and conform their actions and beliefs.20
People can have cognitive dissonance about all sorts of things they think
about or do. Recall that in Festinger’s seminal example, the dissonance resulted
from the need by people thinking the world would end a certain day to account
for the fact that the world did not end that day.21 Cognitive dissonance is in an
important respect individual. Hypocrisy, too, is importantly individual—the
person says one thing and does another. People can have idiosyncratic beliefs
that cause them discomfort, or conflict with one another, without it being a matter
that relates to the broader society.22
18. The relevant literature for my purposes includes C. Daniel Batson et al., In a Very Different
Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1335 (1997); C. Daniel
Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1999) [hereinafter Moral Hypocrisy]; Cécile Sénémeaud et al., Being Hypocritical
Disturbs Some People More than Others: How Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency
Moderate the Behavioral Effects of the Induced-Hypocrisy Paradigm, 9 J. SOC. INFLUENCE 133 (2014).
Yet another related concept is that of self-discrepancy, developed by Tory Higgins. See, e.g., E. Tory
Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCH. REV. 319 (1987). Selfdiscrepancy theory provides evidence for the existence of different types of discomfort people experience
from, roughly speaking, discrepancies between how they view themselves and how they feel they should,
or ideally would, be.
19. Teaching Tip Sheet: Cognitive Dissonance, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pi/aids/
resources/education/dissonance.aspx [https://perma.cc/C4FL-KWWL] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017)
(“Hypocrisy is a special case of cognitive dissonance, produced when a person freely chooses to promote
a behavior that they do not themselves practice.”).
20. See Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy, supra note 18. See also Elliot Aronson et al., Overcoming
Denial and Increasing the Intention to Use Condoms through the Induction of Hypocrisy, 81 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1636 (1991) (providing evidence that hypocrisy induction was effective at overcoming teen
denial of AIDS danger); Fointiat, supra note 13; Jeff Stone & Nicholas C. Fernandez, To Practice What
We Preach: The Use of Hypocrisy and Cognitive Dissonance to Motivate Behavior Change, 2 SOC. &
PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1024 (2008) (reviewing literature on hypocrisy motivating behavior
change); Jeff Stone & Elizabeth Focella, Hypocrisy, Dissonance and the Self-Regulation Processes that
Improve Health, 10 SELF & IDENTITY 295 (2011) (discussing how hypocrisy represents a powerful
strategy for engaging the self-regulation processes that improve health). But see ROBERT KURZBAN,
WHY EVERYONE (ELSE) IS A HYPOCRITE: EVOLUTION AND THE MODULAR MIND (2012) (arguing for
an evolutionary explanation of hypocrisy, and even arguing that hypocrisy is a good thing).
21. PROPHECY, supra note 10.
22. That is not to say that cognitive dissonance and hypocrisy don’t often relate to broader societal
concerns. A congressional representative who defended Ken Starr’s role investigating Bill Clinton
notwithstanding Starr’s contributions to Republican Party candidates, critiquing what he described as a
strategy by Clinton and allies to “demonize” Starr and others who got in their way, strongly criticized the
bias of the Mueller team, noting that they had donated to Democrats. See Jeremy Stahl, This
Congressman Wins the Prize for the Most Odious Attack on Bob Mueller, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/this-congressman-wins-the-prize-for-the-most-odiousattack-on-bob-mueller.html [https://perma.cc/E9RN-23FW].
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By contrast, this article uses the term cheap sentiment to refer to matters
where the cheapness—the cost not being paid—is societal. The person gets the
benefit of holding their belief, but the cost is external. If the person acts, or
presses for action to be taken, in furtherance of the belief, the cost may even be
externalized—society bears the cost.
What kinds of benefits are people getting from their cheap sentiment? In
what sense is the sentiment self-interested? In most cases, the belief is part of
people’s “self-concept and self-integrity.”23 People have a stake in thinking of
themselves in a certain way. The claim here is not that this is mistaken or
dishonest or constitutes self-deception.24 Rather, it is that being able to think of
themselves in that way constitutes a benefit. With the benefit comes a cost; again,
cheap sentiment is about wanting the benefit while not being in principle willing
to bear the cost. This mindset is of social concern insofar as cheap sentiment
motivates policy.
While the beliefs at issue relate to people’s self-concept and self-integrity,
they are importantly social, relating to beliefs held or stated by others. An
explanation or justification for an inconsistency will serve its purpose only if the
relevant community accepts it as such. Norms develop as to what explanations
and justifications pass muster. A perhaps fanciful example: when I was in my
teens, most of my peers were anti-fur coat, but at the same time were willing to
buy cheap used fur coats at vintage stores. Our explanation, when confronted,
was that our purchase did not cause the animal to be killed—the animal had
already been killed, for the person willing to pay full price for the coat. At a
certain point, that explanation stopped being acceptable among my peers, and
we stopped buying the coats. Returning for a moment to the surge pricing
examples, the reaction of outrage, both in the emergency and non-emergency
situations, clearly passes muster in some communities—if it did not, there would
not be much of a push to change policy to outlaw or limit surge pricing.
In his article on cognitive dissonance, economist Matt Rabin makes a related
point. Rabin characterizes a phenomenon similar to cheap sentiment as cognitive
dissonance: the situation in which a person thinks of herself as moral but does not
behave as morality requires. He characterizes such a situation as involving
dissonance—that is, discomfort.25 Rabin states that:

23. Fointiat, supra note 13, at 742.
24. The role of self-deception in hypocrisy is discussed in, e.g., Moral Hypocrisy, supra note 18. On
self-deception and rationalization see, e.g., Robert Audi, Self-Deception, Rationalization, and Reasons
for Acting, in PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DECEPTION (Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg
Rorty eds., 1988); William von Hippel & Robert Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of SelfDeception, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2011); David H. Sanford, Self-Deception as Rationalization, in
PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DECEPTION (Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1988);
Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114
(2000).
25. In the context of cheap sentiment, I take no position as to what morality requires, nor do I take
a position as to whether people experience discomfort.

HILL_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

74

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/9/2018 10:55 AM

[Vol. 81:67

[C]hanges in beliefs by some individuals towards the “true” morality are likely to
increase the cost to other people of having beliefs far away from the “true” morality.
People find it harder to convince themselves that an activity is ethical if nobody else
believes it is ethical. If everybody else decides that torturing animals for fur is wrong,
then it becomes harder for an individual to convince himself that there is nothing wrong
with wearing fur. Conversely, if everybody ignores the suffering caused to the animals,
then it becomes easier for each person to ignore the true nature of his actions.
These social effects in belief-formation have an important implication: a greater distaste
for cognitive dissonance may lead not to less of an immoral activity, but rather to more
of it. While a greater distaste for cognitive dissonance has the direct effect of decreasing
the level of immoral activities, an indirect effect works in the opposite direction.
Stronger cognitive dissonance will cause each person to believe that such activities are
more acceptable; this in turns leads others to believe that the activity is more acceptable
. . . [T]his leads to more of the activity.26

Cheap sentiment involves people who benefit from having certain beliefs
that, if translated into policy, would result in others, and perhaps at some point,
themselves, bearing costs—costs that they themselves are not bearing at the time.
Cheap sentiment thus potentially runs afoul of John Rawls’s conception of
justice, according to which law should be developed as though its developers were
behind a veil of ignorance.27 In this conception, people do not know their class or
status in society, their “fortune in distribution of natural assets and abilities,”
their “intelligence and strength and the like”28 or many other things. From behind
such a veil, they can “evaluate principles solely on the basis of general
considerations.”29
But people are of course not behind a veil of ignorance. They know, or they
think they know, a great deal about their own attributes and circumstances. The
paradigmatic case of cheap sentiment is one where the person can be assured of
not bearing any consequent costs. In the 1991 movie Dances With Wolves,
Lieutenant John Dunbar, a Union officer, “finds himself alone in Indian territory
in the 1860s, and eventually ‘finds himself,’ in the 1960s sense of the term, when
he adopts a Sioux identity and name, Dances With Wolves.”30 A review of the
movie by Caryn James astutely noted that, “Viewers enjoy a rousing old
adventure and still feel they can save the planet. By assuming the point of view
of Dunbar, the good and prescient white man, ‘Dances With Wolves’ becomes an
appealing hybrid, a western without guilt.”31 A (white) person watching the

26. Rabin, supra note 8, at 179.
27. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id. at 136–37. Various aspects of Rawls’s theory have been criticized. For a prominent critique
of Rawls’s theory see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). See also
C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895 (1985) (summarizing and critiquing Sandel’s
critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice). But my use of Rawls here is largely orthogonal to the arguments
in question; I am using his theory simply to articulate, using a different vocabulary, one important respect
in which cheap sentiment is objectionable.
30. Caryn James, Frugging with Wolves, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/
01/13/movies/film-view-frugging-with-wolves.html [https://perma.cc/77V6-KSGS].
31. Id.
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movie can feel a virtuous identification with the Indians, and imagine that had he
existed at the time, he too would have fought the good fight, and espoused proIndian laws and policies without having to do anything perilous, or really,
anything at all.32
The costs of cheap sentiment go beyond those mentioned above. Standard
economic theory suggests that when people can obtain a benefit without paying
the associated cost, they will do so more than they would if they were paying it.
A company that does not have to clean up the pollution it creates can be expected
to create more pollution than one that does have to clean it up. Similarly, if I can
think of myself as being virtuous and other-regarding when I do not have to
sacrifice to do so, why would I not do it? The waters may be muddied, such that
the esteem and recognition from others that may in part motivate being otherregarding may not be so readily forthcoming. Being other-regarding may become
less rewarding, which may lead to less other-regardingness.
B. Examples of Cheap Sentiment
The following are examples of possible cheap sentiment. The person who
rejects compensated organ donors may think of herself as being other-regarding,
caring very much that there are not enough organs available for transplantation,
but also as valuing altruism over (crass) commerce. The person who objects to
the practice of paying very little for labor probably thinks of herself as otherregarding as well, caring for others, particularly those less fortunate. She might
think herself to be morally superior to those who do not have this view and
particularly, to those who arrange for products made with cheap labor to be
produced and sold. She might tell herself and others that if the t-shirt company’s
executive officers were only paid what they were worth, they could pay a fair
price for labor and sell t-shirts cheaply, thus justifying her purchase.33 Benefits of
cheap labor to countries going through a “t-shirt phase” and to laborers whose
alternatives are worse are not acknowledged.34
32. Cheap sentiment is of course a small subset of what Rawls’s theory would criticize. A person
certain she is poor wanting a 99% tax rate for rich people would probably not be making her decision
behind a veil of ignorance—she wouldn’t want to pay 99% if she were rich—but there is no “cheap
sentiment.” The policy desired by the poor person is simply self-serving.
33. See Chamberlain, supra note 2. Searches for “child labor” or “cheap labor” yield many articles
with expressions of outrage. There are articles, too, about how many developing countries went through
a “t-shirt phase.” Finally, and most pertinently to my thesis, there are articles about how the same people
who are outraged seem to be buying the cheap t-shirts anyway. See also Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk
et al., Covering the World: Some Conclusions to the Project, in THE ASHGATE COMPANION TO THE
HISTORY OF TEXTILE WORKERS, 1650-2000, at 773 (Lex Heerma van Voss et al. eds., 2010) (discussing
“race to the bottom” in global textile industry).
34. See R.A., Out of Harm’s Way: What Next for the World’s Poorest Workers?, THE ECONOMIST
(May
22,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/technology
[https://
perma.cc/PW6A-QYV7]; Adam Davidson, Economic Recovery, Made in Bangladesh?, N.Y. TIMES (May
14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/magazine/economic-recovery-made-in-bangladesh.html
[https://perma.cc/8WRV-WGRH]. A related example involves the “NIMBY,” “not in my back yard,”
phenomenon. Someone thinking of herself as having a social conscience may think that there should be
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Returning to the medical arena, an important context for cheap sentiment is
the selection criteria for allocation of organs and other scarce resources. Familiar
examples include the extent to which somebody’s own “responsibility” for the
condition that caused her to need an organ or some medical care she cannot
afford should accord her a lesser priority. That the person is “responsible” might
yield an assessment that the prior conduct is apt to be repeated, making the
expenditure less valuable for that person than for some other person. Other
examples are individuals who require vast expenditures on their care,35 including
those near the end of their lives. Some people find the prospect of making such
an allocation paralyzing, not wishing to be the sort of person who would decide
not to treat someone, notwithstanding that absent an express allocation, there is
simply not enough money to treat everyone, and there will still be denials of
care.36 The benefit to not making the decision is that the person does not have to
a halfway house or other facility for people who have served their prison sentences, to help such people
transition to post-prison life—but not in her back yard. See generally Peter D. Kinder, Not in My
Backyard Phenomenon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Not-in-MyBackyard-Phenomenon [https://perma.cc/6GY3-EU42] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017) (discussing historical
origins of “Nimby” and its common usages). Rationalizations may be given for why some other locale
would be more desirable. I recall such an example from my childhood: a liberal community objecting to
low-income housing in their community. See David M. Herszenhorn, Neighborhood Report: Forest Hills;
At the Forest Hills Co-op, a Reminder of Past Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/10/22/nyregion/neighborhood-report-forest-hills-forest-hills-op-reminder-past-fury.html
[https://perma.cc/5A8M-AWHQ]. But one can imagine a principled, albeit societally unfortunate,
perspective, which was in fact one of the things said at the time: that the people had clawed their way out
of the Lower East Side, then a ghetto, but now the Lower East Side was coming to them—that they were
being asked to take on “more than their share” of sacrifice for the society. Is this a rationalization?
Reasonable people can differ on this point. School choice is another important context. See, e.g., Dianna
Douglas, Are Private Schools Immoral?: A Conversation with Nikole Hannah-Jones about Race,
Education, and Hypocrisy, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2017/12/progressives-are-undermining-public-schools/548084/
[https://perma.cc/
UX3V-VFAF] (“‘White communities want neighborhood schools if their neighborhood school is white,’
[Hannah-Jones] says. ‘If their neighborhood school is black, they want choice.’ Charter schools and
magnet schools spring up in place of neighborhood schools, where white students can be in the
majority.”).
35. An example is the Iowa patient whose cost to their insurer (which is reflected in premiums
charged to other people) is $1 million a month, a cost expected to be payable as long as the (young)
patient lives? Michael Hiltzik, This One Unbelievably Expensive Iowa Patient Makes the Case for SinglePayer Healthcare, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-iowa20170424-story.html [https://perma.cc/88LW-4THZ]; Tony Leys, Iowa Teen’s $1 Million-per-Month
Illness No Longer a Secret, USA TODAY (May 31, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2017/06/01/iowa-teens-1-million-per-month-illness-no-longer-secret/360919001/
[https://perma.cc/HJ2G-RZEL]. The story may, however, be a bit murkier than it was initially presented
as being. See Jonathan Cohn, An Iowa Teenager Didn’t Wreck His State’s Health Care Market. Here’s
Who Did: A Case Study in Obamacare Success and Failure, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iowa-teenager-obamacare-scapegoat_us_59f4715de4b077d8dfc9
dd70?ncid=APPLENEWS00001 [https://perma.cc/59M5-BK2H].
36. The extensive literature on omission vs. commission is relevant here. In the famous trolley
problem, people won’t take an action that would kill one person even though the result would be to save
five others. For two popular accounts of the trolley problem, see Sarah Bakewell, Clang Went the Trolley:
“Would You Kill the Fat Man?” and “The Trolley Problem,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/books/review/would-you-kill-the-fat-man-and-the-trolley-problem.
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think of herself as the sort of person who decides against giving someone an organ
or needed care. If no decision is made, the basis on which people do not get an
organ or care may be based more on luck than on any reasoned consideration.37
Other examples of cheap sentiment include views about higher prices for eggs
from women who have certain desirable attributes,38 and, more fancifully, the
practice of some bars and clubs of giving good-looking people preferential access
to their venues.39 Those objecting to giving preferential treatment to individuals
based on their appearance might be people who oppose valuing appearance to
this extent or in this context or manner. Furthermore, those objecting might not
desire to buy or sell eggs or get into selective nightclubs—think in this regard of
the colloquial expression “Easy for you to say!”—or might feel disvalued by the

html [https://perma.cc/NX9Z-69WH]; Lauren Cassani Davis, Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does
It Matter?: The Lifespan of a Thought Experiment, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/trolley-problem-history-psychology-moralitydriverless-cars/409732/ [https://perma.cc/W7YT-LXJY]. There is also extensive literature on the related
subject of taboo trade-offs. See generally Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Allocating Scarce Resources:
A Contingency Model of Distributive Justice, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1992) (The
authors found that “[u]nder scarcity, allocators were much more likely to deny aid to claimants who were
responsible for their predicament. Need and efficiency emerged as joint predictors of allocating aid to
claimants who were not responsible for their predicament. Politically conservative allocators withheld
resources from those personally responsible for their needs regardless of both severity of need and
likelihood of effective helping, even when there were sufficient resources to satisfy all claimants, whereas
liberals tended to provide resources to all claimants.”); Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Of Ants and
Grasshoppers: The Political Psychology of Allocating Public Assistance, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 205–33 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan
Baron eds., 1993) (examining subjects’ willingness to make distributive decisions where resources are
scarce vs. where resources are not scarce: “[L]iberals are motivated to avoid painful trade-offs between
important values. Lives-for-money implies a much more painful trade-off than job-opportunities-formoney.”); Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Providing Public Assistance: Cognitive and Motivational
Processes Underlying Liberal and Conservative Policy Preferences, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1205–1223 (1993) (finding evidence “that liberals are not mindlessly egalitarian, but try to avoid socially
awkward value trade-offs that require placing monetary values on lives.”); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Sacred
versus Pseudo-Sacred Values: How People Cope with Taboo Trade-Offs, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96
(2017) (characterizing our world as one in which the sacred competes “with the demands of the real
world” and noting that there are “risks and challenges whenever parties’ moral perceptions are
mismatched”).
37. On difficulties in broaching the topic from a cost/benefit perspective, see e.g., Aaron E. Carroll,
Forbidden Topic in Health Policy Debate: Cost Effectiveness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/upshot/forbidden-topic-in-health-policy-debate-costeffectiveness.html [https://perma.cc/6VAH-N8ZL] (arguing for the use of “quality-adjusted life years” to
inform decision-making in this area).
38. See generally Krawiec, supra note 16; Sharyn Alfonsi, Inside Egg Donation: More Money for
Blondes?, ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/egg-donation-agencies-paid-moneyfavored-attributes/story?id=10614326 [https://perma.cc/TPW5-4PNZ] (reporting that egg donors may be
paid more for their donations if they are blond, thin, tall, have a college degree, and high SAT scores;
“One employee, Rachel, was told that her eggs were worth more because she’s a blonde. Another, Susan,
responded to an ad for Asian donors and was told her degree from Wellesley made her eggs more
valuable, to the tune of $25,000. That’s more than $15,000 over industry guidelines.”).
39. See, e.g., Guy Birchall, Are You Hot Enough to Get into this Club?, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 29,
2016),
http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/beauty/face-body/are-you-hot-enough-to-get-into-this-club/
news-story/f5953b513fefd3409459404f9418069b [https://perma.cc/X7AE-4GNC].
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emphasis on traits they may not have as much of as they want.40 These objectors
may exhibit cheap sentiment.41
A final set of examples, admittedly more attenuated, involve differential
pricing, including surge pricing. Where is the self-interest here? First, consider
the non-emergency cases. Based on their previous experience, people had
counted on some level of pricing, and now must get used to a different and worse
state of affairs (higher prices). Airline prices used to include baggage and meals;
increasingly, they do not.42 Fares to get places were the same no matter the time
of day; now, they may be higher at peak times.43 Those objecting to the changes
may express annoyance at what they see as airlines’ ability to get them to pay
more,44 and not acknowledge the market-based rationales for these changes—
why should someone not bringing luggage be charged the same for a plane trip
as someone who is bringing luggage?45 Surge pricing during emergencies might
be objected to on grounds that companies should not increase the prices of
necessary items or services during emergencies. People get to avoid reproaching
themselves for not having planned ahead. The presumably reduced supply
resulting from prohibiting surge pricing in these cases would not be
acknowledged.46
40. Consider in this regard KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE
MONKEY HOUSE (1968). This short story describes a society that decides to equalize all talents. A
“Handicapper General” makes sure that nobody is better looking, stronger, or quicker than anyone else.
41. This point should not be carried too far: a person who could not be drafted on grounds of their
age or bad health could have a principled and non-cheap view that the draft is a good thing. As with so
many other concepts, cheap sentiment is on a continuum, and the same view might be cheap sentiment,
or not, depending on other factors.
42. Unbundling in the Airline Business, BEYOND COST PLUS (June 2, 2015),
https://www.beyondcostplus.com/blog/unbundling-airline-business [https://perma.cc/TLQ6-6N2A].
43. Another related example is where umbrellas are higher priced during a storm. The self-interest
might be in not having to reproach oneself for not planning ahead. Differential pricing generally—
charging different people different prices, and unbundling of previously bundled prices—does seem to
bother people, even though people are quite inconsistent about it. People are not bothered, for instance,
by discounts for students or senior citizens, or extra charges for meals on important holidays. See Irwin,
supra note 3.
44. Chris Matyszczyk, Want to See All the Nasty Fees Your Airline Charges? The Government Just
Said You Can’t, INC. (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.inc.com/chris-matyszczyk/want-to-know-all-annoyingfees-your-airline-charges-government-just-decided-you-shouldnt.html [https://perma.cc/JNG2-43M2].
45. Interestingly a few, exceedingly tentative, steps have been taken towards taking the ‘extra weight
should mean extra costs’ rationale so far as to make people who weigh more pay more for their plane
trips. See, e.g., Beth Blair, Should Obese Passengers Pay More to Fly?, BBC (Oct. 20, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20161020-should-obese-passengers-pay-more [https://perma.cc/M2DKWEZ9]; Alex Davies, How Long Until All Airlines Charge More for Fat People?, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5,
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/will-big-airlines-charge-fat-passengers-extra-2013-4 [https://
perma.cc/WG2Y-KDAS].
46. A company could decide for reputational reasons not to engage in surge pricing, especially in
emergency situations. Home Depot has apparently rejected surge pricing in emergencies, and indeed,
has adopted the opposite strategy: “The first thing they did was direct all prices to be frozen in areas
likely to be affected by the storm. There is no surge pricing at Home Depot stores after a disaster, in both
a longstanding corporate policy and a matter of law in many states. But the company doesn’t stop with
that. All those logistics people and other staffers are there to ensure that the surge in demand after a
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III
TAKING CONSEQUENCES INTO ACCOUNT
This article aims to have the consequences of cheap sentiment better taken
into account before instantiating cheap sentiment into policy. What would that
entail?
It does not necessarily entail deciding in favor of market-oriented solutions
where these may conflict with expressive law or policy. Recall the example above
of locating a polluting factory in a country that had high poverty and low life
expectancy. Citizens of the country could be paid so much that they might have
a much better life for the short time they lived, whereas their alternative would
be to continue to live in poverty and die young. The choice would be between a
comfortable short life and an uncomfortable, but equally short, life. Banking on
a country’s continuing impoverished state as a rationale for a business decision
seems repugnant. Should we second-guess a decision to not even consider
locating the factory in the poor country on grounds that we are engaging in cheap
sentiment? Or should strong consensus about what constitutes repugnance be
sufficient to outweigh instrumental benefits?
Consider the arguments about permitting versus prohibiting needle
exchanges for illegal drugs, and for sex education and access to contraceptives for
underage and unmarried adults. In both cases, the expressive story is given—the
society does not want to encourage, or communicate its encouragement of, more
drug use; the society does not want to encourage, or communicate its
encouragement of, sex among unmarried teenagers. In both cases, there are
serious costs of maintaining this posture. Data suggests that the net effect of
having needle exchanges makes taking drugs less dangerous,47 and the net effect
of less access to sex education and contraception and a focus on abstinence
education makes teenaged pregnancy and STDs more likely.48 But, proponents
of taking the expressive stance say, if society says these types of behaviors are
acceptable by providing clean needles or sex education, there will be more of
them; if society says the behaviors are unacceptable, they may decline. Who
knows? Complicating the issue is that people have different views about the
behaviors, such that encouraging the behaviors may seem far worse to some than
to others. Addressing the drug/contraception context and other like contexts, the
“harm reduction/it’s going to happen anyway” argument has much more force to
disaster is matched with a higher supply of the goods people need. As hurricane season approaches,
dedicated warehouses are stocked with goods that will be needed if a major storm hits, according to the
company’s director of corporate communications, Stephen Holmes. And that’s why, as soon as Irma
passed the Miami area and the major highways were confirmed to be passable, a convoy of 41 tractortrailers full of generators, plywood, chain saws and similar items trekked from Georgia to South Florida,
escorted by the police.” Irwin, supra note 3.
47. Syringe Services Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/ssps.html [https://perma.cc/25YF-9XPF].
48. Kathrin F. Stanger-Hall & David W. Hall, Abstinence-Only Education and Teen Pregnancy
Rates: Why We Need Comprehensive Sex Education in the U.S., 6 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2011).
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people who think the behavior is not so bad and that the people who engage in it
are sympathetic victims; it will have much less force for people who think the
behavior is very bad and that the people who engage in it are fully responsible
for their own bad choices.
Taking consequences into account does not mean accepting the status quo as
inviolate. Consider the following quote about surge pricing:
Those who object to surge pricing, even those of us who understand it, would rather live
in a world where people would do the moral thing—give someone a ride out of the
danger zone, without making them pay through the nose. I know we don’t live in such
a world, but I sure wish we did. And acknowledging that we don’t feels like admitting
failure. Research has shown that markets don’t just force us to confront our selfishness,
but often make it even worse.49

Does assuming that people will do what their material self-interest requires
make that outcome more likely? To increase the availability of organs for
transplantation, we may conclude that some well-crafted financial inducements
ultimately would yield the best results, but the idea that too much of a market
focus might crowd out altruistic donation should be taken seriously.
Compounding the complexity of the issue, even absent an expressive effect,
we are not very good at predicting consequences. It is easy enough to predict that,
all else equal, the prospect of making money serves as an incentive, and the
prospect of going to prison serves as a disincentive. But all else is never equal.
Those advocating for an increase in the minimum wage might seem to be
engaging in cheap sentiment when they argue that “everyone” should make at
least a living wage. It might seem that they are ignoring realities of economics—
that if something costs more, less of it will be purchased, including higher-priced
labor. But efforts to demonstrate the effects of increasing the minimum wage
have not yielded a definitive answer.50 People react in complex ways. In
particular, assuming that people are principally motivated by narrow material
self-interest, as economists have traditionally done, turns out to predict less than
the economists had thought, or at least claimed. For instance, economics had not
predicted that people are as altruistic as they turn out to be.51 Also contradicting
49. Sullivan, supra note 3.
50. See generally Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 479–80 (2018) (“The ‘baggage’ of identity helps explain why evidence pointed
to by one side will often not suffice for (or convince) the other side. Consider the debate about the
desirability of greatly raising the minimum wage. Differing priors may include different commitments to
theory, different views about “factual” matters, such as the availability of opportunities, and different
values as to the obligations and privileges of citizenship.”).
51. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity—Evidence and
Economic Applications, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, ECONOMETRIC
SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, EIGHTH WORLD CONGRESS 208, 250 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003)
(“The self-interest model has been very successful in explaining individual behavior on competitive
markets, but it is unambiguously refuted in many situations in which individuals interact strategically.
The experimental evidence on, e.g., ultimatum games, dictator games, gift exchange games, and public
good games, demonstrates unambiguously that many people are not only maximizing their own material
payoffs, but that they are also concerned about social comparisons, fairness, and the desire to
reciprocate.”).
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some canonical economics expectations, a famous experiment found that parents
were more apt to pick up their children late from day care when a fine was
instituted; simple economic reasoning would have predicted less lateness, but it
turns out that people prefer paying money to feeling guilty.52 What follows from
this? That there is no way to distinguish in a rigorous principled way between
cases where our best estimate of the instrumental costs of a legal prohibition or
permission at a particular point in time ought to weigh more heavily than the
expressive message sent by having the prohibition or permission. But that does
not mean we should not try harder than we presently do to limit the force of
cheap sentiment.
IV
CONCLUSION
Cheap sentiment is a belief an individual has from which she benefits, without
appreciating, acknowledging, or paying the associated costs. Academics write as
though people should hold consistent beliefs, but this “should” surely has no
force, moral or otherwise, for society generally. Significantly, cheap sentiments
are not just individual—they are social, passing muster in the communities in
which individuals exist and define themselves. Especially because they are social,
they influence policymakers. Cheap sentiment or more precisely, conduct or
positions based on cheap sentiment, can thus be condemned for its potential
policy effects. Cheap sentiment is a common phenomenon: it arises not only in
notoriously charged areas such as transactions involving organs, blood, or other
bodily parts or substances, but also in further-flung areas, including some that
might initially seem less charged, such as differential pricing.
Policy ought to do the best it can to take consequences into account. Of
course, what will happen under different scenarios cannot necessarily be known
or agreed upon. But society benefits when we try. This surely is not controversial;
my contribution is to identify a pervasive pathology that prevents us from doing
better on this front, one that leads to us being too quick not to consider certain
possibilities or even ruling them out altogether without giving them due
consideration. I hope that by characterizing the phenomenon of cheap sentiment
as a pathology, and accommodation to it as problematic and not inevitable, my
framing can serve as a needed counterweight.

52. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). See also Samuel
Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence
from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605 (2008) (“[I]ncentives that appeal to self-interest may fail
when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited
ways.”).

